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Federal Disclosure Statutes
and the Fifth Amendment:
The New Status of Trade Secrets
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,1 the Supreme Court held
that trade secrets recognized as property by state law are protected
from uncompensated disclosure by the takings clause of the fifth
amendment.2 But the Court also appeared to decide that, if the
trade secret has been disclosed to the federal government, this pro-
tection attaches only if the disclosure statute that allowed the fed-
eral government to learn the secret contains an explicit assurance
of confidentiality. If this two-part reading of Monsanto is correct,
the decision is both internally inconsistent and in opposition to the
Court's other takings clause decisions. Moreover, this interpreta-
tion leaves open the unacceptable possibility that a notice stat-
ute-informing the public that a certain class of interests previ-
ously protected by the law will no longer enjoy such
protection-may be used to take, without compensation, property
interests in a trade secret that has yet to be created.
Monsanto's first principle-that trade secrets recognized as
property by state law are entitled to fifth amendment protec-
tion-has important implications for the interpretation of federal
disclosure statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). s In interpreting these statutes, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has developed a fed-
eral common law definition of trade secrets that is much narrower
than that of most states. Thus, under FOIA, the government often
discloses trade secret property without compensation. Confidential
business information is particularly vulnerable to federal disclosure
because of the wide divergence in the way federal common law and
state law define nontechnical trade secrets.
This comment scrutinizes the prevailing interpretation of
Monsanto, just summarized, in light of fifth amendment jurispru-
dence and argues that this interpretation is inconsistent and unjus-
1 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
2 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. V.
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
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tified. The comment concludes that Monsanto instead should be
understood both to protect trade secret property without the re-
quirement of federal statutory validation and to recognize that
complete takings pursuant to a notice statute may well be
unconstitutional.
This more coherent reading of Monsanto would mandate ma-
jor changes in the application of FOIA by demanding fifth amend-
ment protections for trade secrets that are recognized as property
under state law. Indeed, even under the existing reading of the
opinion-conditioning protection on the government's promise of
confidentiality-the Monsanto decision compels changes in FOIA
disclosure practice so as to avoid violations of the fifth
amendment.
I. THE RUCKELSHAUS V. MONSANTO DECISION
In Monsanto, the Court squarely held for the first time that
trade secrets may constitute property interests within the meaning
of the fifth amendment.4 In this case, Monsanto Company, a pesti-
cide manufacturer, challenged certain disclosure provisions of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).5
FIFRA requires that a pesticide be registered with the Environ-
4 467 U.S. at 1000-04. Before Monsanto, it was sometimes denied that trade secrets
were property, relying on a famous dictum by Justice Holmes:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed ex-
pression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes
some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through special confi-
dence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be.
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of
law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). This dictum
seems to make rights in trade secrets essentially contractual. But it has not been much
followed by state courts. See Roger M. Milgrim, 1 Trade Secrets § 1.01[1] (1985). The Court
in Monsanto distinguished Masland by asserting that Holmes in this passage "did not deny
the existence of a property interest; he simply deemed determination of the existence of
that interest irrelevant to resolution of the case." 467 U.S. at 1004 n.9. Under this reading,
Masland left open the question of property rights in trade secrets. This interpretation is
certainly plausible, inasmuch as Masland involved a dispute between private parties in
which there was no need to consider whether the trade secret status of the information
conferred any rights against the world. By contrast, FIFRA (and FOIA as well) involve
agencies of the federal government, where the submitter never stood in any relationship of
trust or confidence with the party threatening disclosure. Thus, if the secret is to be pro-
tected at all in the FIFRA or FOIA contexts the protection must necessarily partake of one
of the primary characteristics of property, the right to exclude others regardless of their
previous relationship with the trade secret owner.
5 7 U.S.C. § 136 et. seq. (1982).
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) before it may be sold in inter-
state or foreign commerce; since it was amended in 1972, the stat-
ute also has stipulated that the EPA shall not register a pesticide
unless it determines that the pesticide will not cause "unreason-
able adverse effects on the environment."6 The Court held that
Monsanto's data on environmental effects constituted a trade se-
cret property right under Missouri law,7 and that the property
right was protected by the takings clause." But the Court limited
the fifth amendment's protection to data submitted between 1972
and 1978, the period when FIFRA explicitly promised
confidentiality.9
FIFRA authorizes the EPA to collect data from manufacturers
on the health and safety effects of pesticides and to disclose cer-
tain elements of that data. Before 1972, the statute had been silent
with respect to the EPA's use or disclosure of data submitted to it
in connection with an application for registration. In 1972, Con-
gress amended FIFRA to prohibit the EPA from publicly disclos-
ing information that, in its judgment, contained or related to
"trade secrets or commercial or financial information,"'10 and to
permit a submitter of data to identify those parts of the data it
considered to be "trade secrets or commercial or financial informa-
tion."1 In 1978, Congress refined FIFRA's disclosure provisions to
allow the EPA to consider the health and safety information sub-
mitted by one manufacturer in the registration process for similar
chemicals of another manufacturer. However, the EPA could use
these data only after expiration of a ten-year exclusive use period
for the submitter. In addition, data submitted after December 31,
1969, could be used in another company's application for registra-
tion for fifteen years after the data were submitted, provided the
6 Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C),(D).
" The district court had found that those data had value to Monsanto beyond their use
in connection with a particular license application, and that they would also be valuable to
Monsanto's competitors. Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm., United States E.P.A., 564 F.Supp.
552, 560 (E.D. Mo. 1983). The district court found further that much of the data "contains
or relates to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of Torts [section 757] and Confi-
dential, [sic] commercial information." Id. at 562. The court held that Monsanto had prop-
erty rights in its submitted data, including the right to exclude others from making use of
the information, and that the FIFRA provisions in question effected a taking of that prop-
erty both for private use and without adequate compensation. Id. at 566-67.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
Id. at 1011.
'0 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b).
21 Id. § 136h(a)l. If the EPA and a submitter of data disagreed as to whether or not
the data were trade secrets, the submitter was given the right to institute a declaratory
judgment action in federal district court. Id. § 136h(c).
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applicant compensated the submitter.12 Compegasation for the data
was set by a process of agreement backed by binding arbitration.' 3
The 1978 amendments also provided for disclosure of health,
safety, and environmental data to the public notwithstanding the
prohibition against disclosure of trade secrets in section 136h(b).' 4
In analyzing the takings issue, the Court first determined that
Monsanto's trade secrets were property under Missouri law.15
Next, it separated the data submissions according to the three per-
tinent periods-pre-1972, 1972 to 1978, and post-1978-and con-
sidered for each period whether the EPA's use of the data from
that period in evaluating applications of competing pesticide man-
ufacturers constituted a taking of Monsanto's property.
Concentrating on whether the EPA's use of the data had in-
terfered with "reasonable investment-backed expectations,' 6 the
Court found that the 1978 amendments to FIFRA had eliminated
any possible expectation Monsanto could have had that subse-
quently submitted data would be kept confidential. The amend-
ments, the Court said, put Monsanto on notice that if it chose to
submit data pertaining to a new active ingredient after the amend-
ments became effective, the EPA could disclose that data after the
statutory ten-year waiting period had elapsed.' 7
For data from the 1972 to 1978 period, by contrast, the Court
decided that the explicit guarantee of protection established by the
1972 amendments formed the basis of a reasonable investment-
backed expectation.' 8 However, the Court refused to hold that the
government's use of Monsanto's data constituted a taking; such a
finding, the Court declared, would be "premature," since no arbi-
12 Id. § 136a(c)(1)(d)(ii).
3 Id.
11 Id. § 136h(d). However, under the 1978 amendments, information that would reveal
"manufacturing or quality control processes" or deliberately added inert ingredients may
not be disclosed unless "the Administrator has first determined that the disclosure is neces-
sary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Id.
§ 136h(d)(1)(A)-(C).
" Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. Several Missouri cases had held that trade secrets
were property. See, e.g., Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., 354 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Mo.
App. 1962); Harrington v. National Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 532, 196 S.W.2d
786, 791 (1946); Luckett v. Orange Julep Co., 271 Mo. 289, 302-04, 196 S.W. 740, 743 (1917).
16 467 U.S. at 1005, following the test employed in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980), and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
1' Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006-07. Note that if there were no possibility of a reasonable
investment-backed expectation when the pre-1972 FIFRA statute was silent on the issue of
confidentiality, why should notice of disclosure in the statute be required, or even relevant?
" Id. at 1011.
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tration had taken place yet regarding the use of the data and the
Court thus could not resolve the issue of "just compensation."19
Nevertheless, the Court went on to decide that if the use were held
to constitute a taking, it would be of a "public character," despite
the fact that the direct beneficiaries were other pesticide manufac-
turers. The public purpose lay in Congress's goal of making new
pesticides available to consumers more quickly by eliminating
costly, duplicative health testing.20 Since the taking would be for
public use, the Court held, Monsanto could not enjoin the EPA's
actions: the company's only remedy for disclosure of data submit-
ted between 1972 and 1978 would be a Tucker Act21 suit for mone-
tary damages. 2
2
Finally, the Court turned to the data submitted before 1972.
Before the 1972 amendments, FIFRA was silent with respect to
EPA's use of data. But the Trade Secrets Act23 made it a crime for
any federal employee to disclose, in any manner not authorized by
law, any trade secret information revealed to him during the course
of his official duties. In addition, the district court had found that
the government's policy before 1970 was to maintain the confiden-
tiality of submitted data unless the submitter consented to disclos-
ure.24 Nonetheless, the Court decided that these understandings
did not create a reasonable investment-backed expectation that
the data would not be disclosed.25 The Trade Secrets Act, the
Court said, "[was] not a guarantee of confidentiality to submitters
of data. ' 26 The Court observed that the pesticide industry "long
has been the focus of great public concern and significant govern-
ment regulation"; under these circumstances, the "possibility was
substantial" that the government would find disclosure of submit-
19 Id. at 1013. For a detailed consideration of the operation of FIFRA's statutory com-
pensation scheme, see Note, Compensating Manufacturers Submitting Health and Safety
Data to Support Product Registrations After Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 61 Ind. L. J. 189,
202-10 (1986). On the question of what compensation is "just," see Lawrence Blum and
David Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569
(1984).
20 467 U.S. at 1014-16.
2' 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982): "The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Consti-
tution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated dam-
ages in cases not sounding in tort."
22 467 U.S. at 1019.
.3 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982).
24 Monsanto Co., 564 F.Supp. at 564.
25 467 U.S. at 1009.
28 Id. at 1008.
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ted data to be in the public interest. 7 Accordingly, the Court held
that disclosure of data submitted before enactment of the 1972
amendments was not a taking.28
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person shall
• . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. 2 9 Determining whether a particular governmental
action is a proscribed "taking" requires consideration of the follow-
ing questions: (1) whether the affected item is a form of "property"
within the purview of the amendment; (2) if so, whether the gov-
ernment action constitutes a "taking" of the property; (3) if there
is a taking, whether it is for a "public purpose; 's3 and (4) whether
"just compensation" has been provided.
A. The Definition of "Property"
The "property" protected by the takings clause "includes the
entire 'group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership].' It is
not used in the 'vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing
to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead, it]
denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.
• . . The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of in-
terest the citizen may possess.' -
Although the Constitution prohibits the uncompensated tak-
ing of private property, it does not itself identify or define the
property that is to be protected. Instead, property interests "are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or un-
derstandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law."'3 2 The "rules or understandings" that create the property in-
'" Id. at 1008-09.
28 Id. at 1010.
29 U.S. Const. amend. V. The guarantee against takings was one of the first provisions
of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment; it applies both to
state and to federal governments. See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
30 If it is not for a public purpose, a governmental taking is forbidden entirely. See text
accompanying notes 54-55 below.
3 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82 n.6, quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (citations omitted).
32 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). This is true for property pro-
tected under the takings clause as well as for property under the due process clauses of the
1987]
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terest may be statutes, 33 judge-made law,3 4 or even implied state or
federal government promises.3 5 In some situations, the federal gov-
ernment, as well as the states, may create property interests.3 6
However, the fact that the federal government may create
property interests does not mean that it may abrogate state-cre-
ated property interests by defining or conditioning property in a
certain way. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,37 the Su-
preme Court asserted that "as a general proposition . . . the
United States, as opposed to the several States, [is not] possessed
of residual authority that enables it to define 'property' in the first
instance." The federal government thus lacks the power to say that
its definition of property trumps an already recognized state law
property interest. The Court in Monsanto at least recognized this
much. In rejecting the EPA's argument that FIFRA simply "pre-
empted" Monsanto's property interest that was recognized under
Missouri law, the Court observed:
This argument proves too much. If Congress may "pre-empt"
state property law in the manner advocated by EPA, then the
Taking Clause has lost all vitality. This Court has stated that
a sovereign, "by ipse dixit, may not transform private prop-
erty into public property without compensation .... This is
the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth
fifth and fourteenth amendments. In Monsanto itself, the Court used the concept of prop-
erty enunciated in Roth, a due process case, to define property for purposes of the takings
clause. 467 U.S. at 1003.
" See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (statutorily created
cause of action based on discrimination against the handicapped is a property interest).
34 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1977) (property interests in state common law contract rights).
35 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-602 (1972) (college professor may
have had property interest in continued employment, where even though state school had
no formal tenure program, faculty guide suggested that teachers should feel secure in their
positions as long as they were performing their jobs satisfactorily).
36 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (federal Social Security Act's
disability benefits are property); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78. For a view somewhat in tension
with these cases, see Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84 ("as a general proposition ... the United
States, as opposed to the several states, [is not] possessed of residual authority to define
property in the first instance").
The Court has recognized as property a wide variety of state-created interests. In addi-
tion to trade secrets, these interests include horse trainers' licenses, utility services, disabil-
ity benefits, a high school education, government employment, a drivers' license, welfare
benefits, and even a cause of action itself. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 428, 431, and cases cited
therein.
37 447 U.S. at 84. Note that Justice Blackmun concurred in the opinion of the Court
but dissented as to this one sentence. Id. at 88-89.
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Amendment was meant to prevent. '3
Thus Monsanto makes clear that when the federal government im-
poses a rule interfering with an existing state law property right,
the federal action may not simply be passed off as a redefinition of
"property" given preeminence by the supremacy clause.
In addition, the nature of the interest claimed, rather than its
importance or value, determines whether it is property.3 9 "The test
for deciding whether a 'property' interest has been created is to
examine positive law to see whether the government's discretion
has been confined by existing 'rules or understandings.' ,40
B. What Constitutes a "Taking"
In order to decide whether property has been "taken" within
the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, courts ex-
amine the nature of the government action regarding the property.
The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner,
rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign,
constitutes the taking. "Governmental action short of the acquisi-
tion of title or occupancy has been held to amount to a taking...
if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most
of his interest in the subject matter."41 A taking can occur if the
government destroys property as well as if it possesses or occupies
the property for its own use.
The Court often decides whether a taking has occurred by ex-
amining the effect that the government action has on the various
"sticks" that make up the "bundle of rights" collectively thought
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012, quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
39 See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71: "[T]o determine whether due process require-
ments apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the
interest at stake."
40 Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet, Con-
stitutional Law: Cases and Commentary 908 (1986).
41 General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378 (footnote omitted). See generally Annot., Su-
preme Court's Views as to What Constitutes "Taking," Within Meaning of Fifth Amend-
ment's Command That Private Property Not be Taken for Public Use Without Just Com-
pensation, 57 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1979 & Supp. 1985).
42 For example, where the result of government action was to flood petitioner's real
estate, rendering it valueless, the Court held that the property had been taken even though
petitioner retained title to the property. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78
(1871) (construing the takings clause of the Wisconsin constitution, which was nearly identi-
cal to that of the federal Constitution). And in General Motors Corp., the Court observed
that under the fifth and fourteenth amendments "the deprivation of the former owner
rather than the accretion of the right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking."
323 U.S. at 378. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of as "property. ' 43 If the property owner loses too many important
sticks from his bundle, his property has been taken. However, loss
of one or more sticks will not necessarily constitute a taking: "'not
every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has
been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense.' 44 In other
words, not all governmental regulations are takings; it is only when
"regulation goes too far" that it will be deemed a taking.45
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not clearly distin-
guished permissible regulation from impermissible takings. Indeed,
as Professor Sax has pointed out, the Court "has developed the
habit of introducing its uniformly unsatisfactory opinions in this
area with the understatement that 'no rigid rules' or 'set formula'
are available to determine where regulation ends and taking be-
gins. '46 The Court has, however, consistently looked at certain fac-
tors in this otherwise ad hoc inquiry. The "character of the govern-
mental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations '4 all are important in
determining whether a taking has occurred. The Court's takings
jurisprudence can best be understood by examining the factual set-
tings of particular cases.
In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,45 for example, a
shopping center owner appealed a California Supreme Court ruling
that supporters of political causes were entitled, under the free
speech clause of the state constitution, to distribute literature in
the common area of the shopping mall. While the Court recognized
that "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is
the right to exclude others, ' 49 it concluded that the action com-
plained of did not significantly infringe that right by impairing the
owner's value or use. Accordingly, it found that no compensable
taking had occurred.50
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,51 on the other hand, peti-
'3 See, e.g., Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82. See also Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and
the Constitution 26-27 (1977) (noting and criticizing this analysis).
" Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82, quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48
(1960).
4' Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 83, citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922).
Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 37 (1964).
47 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 83. See also Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 106 S.Ct.
1018, 1026 (1986).
's 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
49 Id. at 82.
50 Id. at 83-84.
5- 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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tioners had constructed a private marina that they connected with
the ocean, thereby making it a "navigable waterway" subject to the
federal navigational servitude.5 2 Petitioners charged a fee for the
use of the marina. Relying on the navigational servitude, the gov-
ernment tried to create a right of free public access. Here, the
"stick" in question-the right to exclude others-was the same as
in Pruneyard; but in this case petitioners' pecuniary interests were
directly tied to it and, indeed, were virtually worthless without it.
The Court concluded that the government's attempt to create a
public right of access went "so far beyond ordinary regulation...
as to amount to a taking. '53
Pruneyard and Kaiser Aetna thus illustrate how the magni-
tude of government intrusion on a property right, and the value of
the remaining "sticks," are central to the judgment of whether a
compensable taking has occurred. Government regulation need not
totally destroy a property interest in order to be a taking; if it de-
stroys some rights but leaves others intact, a "partial taking" has
occurred. The question of whether compensation is required inevi-
tably depends on an assessment of the relative importance of what
remains compared to what was taken.
C. "Public Use"
Finally, the fifth amendment assumes that property may be
taken for public use, provided that "just compensation" is paid,
whereas property may never be taken for private use.54 The scope
52 A navigational servitude "gives rise to an authority in the Government to assure that
such streams [as are subject to the servitude] retain their capacity to serve as continuous
highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce." Id. at 177.
11 Id. at 178. The view that regulations under the police power may be compensable
takings is often controversial. In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985), for example,
Justice Blackmun questioned whether such decisions as Monsanto, Kaiser Aetna, and
Pruneyard really "meant to refer literally to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment
...for the proposition that regulation may effect a taking for which the Fifth Amendment
requires just compensation" and whether "the Fifth Amendment requires the payment of
money damages to compensate for such a taking." And in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 455, 459 (1985), Justice White, speaking for a unanimous
Court in a case involving denial of zoning approval for a real estate development, affirmed
the traditional view that only very stringent regulation can amount to a compensable taking:
"Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 'economically via-
ble' use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred." Regulations that
result in public disclosure of trade secrets fall in precisely this category because the value of
trade secrets rests on an indivisible secrecy "stick." Trade secrets cannot, in other words, be
partially taken. See part III below.
1, In Monsanto, for example, the Court held that because the trade secret property
taken was used for public health purposes, no injunction would issue against the taking and
19871
The University of Chicago Law Review [54:334
of "public use" has been held to be coterminous with the very
broad "public purpose" of the police power. 5 Therefore, in most
regulatory cases it is not difficult to establish that the taking was
for a public purpose.
III. MONSANTO: INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
A. Monsanto's Apparent Internal Inconsistency
As we have seen, the purpose of the takings clause of the fifth
amendment is to prevent the federal government from freely con-
verting to public use interests that are recognized as property
under current law. The federal government may not accomplish
this directly by seizing the property; nor may it accomplish it indi-
rectly by so defining "property" as to abrogate an interest already
recognized as property.58 Nevertheless, it seems that under Mon-
santo, trade secrets that are property under state law may not be
property for purposes of the fifth amendment. The case implies
that state property interests are not protected unless Congress val-
idates them by inserting into any disclosure statute a special pro-
tective clause like that contained in FIFRA between 1972 and
1978.57
that the trade secret owner could seek only compensatory damages. Had the taking been for
a private purpose, the Court would have enjoined it. 467 U.S. at 1016. However, the govern-
ment's subsequent retransfer of the property to another private party does not inevitably
mean that the taking was for a private use. Even though the trade secrets in Monsanto were
used to support the permit applications of other private parties, the taking remained one for
a public use because it had a "conceivable public character": it aimed to eliminate duplica-
tive efforts and to streamline the registration process in the safety testing of pesticides. Id.
at 1014-15. See also Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1984);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). For a criticism of the Midkiff Court's broad view
of the scope of "public purpose," see Note, Containing the Effect of Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff on Takings for Private Industry, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 428 (1986).
15 Monsanto, 467 U.S at 1014. But see John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the
Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 243, 285-
86 (1982) (distinguishing public use from public purpose).
', Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84. See also notes 37-38 and accompanying text above.
5 Lower courts have interpreted Monsanto in this way. For example, New Jersey State
Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F.Supp. 606 (D. N.J. 1985) involved the New Jersey
Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 34:5A-1-31 (West Supp. 1986), which provided for disclosure of
the chemical identities of substances used in the workplace if the substances fell within
certain classes of materials deemed to be hazardous. Id. at 610-11. The district court recog-
nized that New Jersey law protects trade secrets as property, id. at 627, but held that the
absence of preexisting legislation explicitly protecting trade secrets submitted by registrants
under the Right to Know Act prevented registrants from having a protectable property in-
terest in the chemical identities. Id. at 628. For a similar holding, see Manufacturers Ass'n
of Tri-County v. Knepper, 623 F.Supp. 1066, 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
In Monsanto itself, Justice O'Connor recognized the absurdity of this aspect of the ma-
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Fifth amendment protection, however, is not contingent upon
federal statutory recognition of state law property rights. Such a
requirement would subordinate the state property right-the "in-
dependent source" that "creates" the right to which fifth amend-
ment protection attaches 58-_to federal legislation. The Court can-
not, without lapsing into incoherence, maintain that federal law
cannot preempt state property interests 59 and at the same time
hold that federal disclosure legislation wipes out such interests
when it does not promise protection. The fifth amendment itself
promises this protection; thus to offer such a promise in legislation
is superfluous, and to require an additional promise before the fifth
amendment protections can take effect is unconstitutional.
The Court in Monsanto invoked federal law in order to
demonstrate that Monsanto could not have had any reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectation of secrecy with respect to data volun-
tarily submitted before 1972 and after 1978. According to the
Court, the fact that during these periods FIFRA required disclos-
jority opinion:
The Court's tacit analysis seems to be this: an expectation of confidentiality can be
grounded only on a statutory nondisclosure provision situated in close physical proxim-
ity, in the pages of the United States Code, to the provisions pursuant to which infor-
mation is submitted to the Government. For my part, I see no reason why Congress
should not be able to give effective protection to all trade secrets submitted to the
Federal Government by means of a single, overarching, trade secrets provision. We rou-
tinely assume that wrongdoers are put on notice of the entire contents of the Code,
though in all likelihood most of them have never owned a copy or opened a single page
of it. It seems strange to assume, on the other hand, that a company like Monsanto,
well served by lawyers who undoubtedly do read the Code, could build an expectation
of privacy in pesticide trade secrets only if the assurance of confidentiality appeared in
Title 7 itself.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1023 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). While Justice
O'Connor's extrapolation of the consequences that flow from the majority view is accurate
and compelling, her analysis commits the same error as the majority opinion: it assumes
that trade secrets are not really protected by the fifth amendment unless some federal stat-
ute says that they are.
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate recently passed substantial modifi-
cations to the data disclosure provisions of FIFRA, but Congress adjourned without enact-
ing either bill. Both versions attempted to broaden access to safety and health test data, in
connection with new provisions establishing substantial criminal penalties for disclosure of
the data or use of the data to manufacture pesticides by the requestor. FIFRA Amendments
of 1986, S.2792, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-02, in 132 Cong. Rec. S 15,355 (Oct. 6, 1986);
FIFRA Amendments of 1986, H.R.2482, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-02, in 132 Cong. Rec. H
11,172 (Oct. 16, 1986). These proposed amendments reflect increased congressional sensitiv-
ity to the problems of trade secret data disclosure under FIFRA, and almost certainly would
have supported a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" of secrecy even under the
inconsistent reading of Monsanto.
" Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
59 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012.
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ure without promising confidentiality obliterated any expectations
of secrecy Monsanto may have had by virtue of the property status
of trade secrets under Missouri law. The Court thus either ignored
expectations created by state trade secret property rights or as-
sumed that these rights were waived. In addition, the Court over-
looked any expectations that may have arisen because of EPA's
pre-1972 policy of using the data of one applicant in support of
another applicant's registration only when the submitter
approved.60
Throughout this analysis, the Court looked to the nature of
Monsanto's expectations-were they reasonable, in light of federal
law?-rather than to the extent of governmental interference with
them. Yet the inquiry into "reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations" usually begins only after establishment of the existence of
legitimate expectations, and then simply considers the magnitude
of the government's intrusion on them. For example, in Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. New York City,61 the Court held that
landmark preservation restrictions on the development of Grand
Central Terminal did not constitute a compensable taking because
they did not interfere with the owner's reasonable investment-
backed expectations. The Court's analysis first acknowledged that
the terminal owner had legitimate expectations in the continued
use of his property.6 2 It concluded, however, that these expecta-
tions had not been substantially defeated, because the owner could
continue to use the property for its current purpose, could develop
it in several ways without running afoul of the landmark restric-
tions, and retained and could transfer the air rights above the
station.6 3
In Monsanto, however, the Court transformed the expecta-
tions inquiry into one that looks very much like its analysis, in
other contexts, of whether there is a property interest in the first
place. As we have seen, "property" exists by virtue of a govern-
ment rule or understanding that creates legitimate expectations of
60 Id. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Monsanto
Co., 564 F.Supp. at 564. Both the majority and Justice O'Connor recognized that the exis-
tence and extent of investment-backed expectations was a question of fact. Id. at 1009 n.14
(applying the clearly erroneous standard to the district court's fact finding about expecta-
tions); id. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting re-
mand for further factual findings on Monsanto's expectations).
61 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
62 Id. at 107, 122.
63 Id. at 137.
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entitlement in certain classes of people.6 The Court's inquiry in
Monsanto into "reasonable investment-backed expectations" looks
very similar to this. And although the Court eschewed any sugges-
tion that its decision rested on the notion that federal law had
somehow conditioned Monsanto's state law property interests,65 its
examination of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" sug-
gests otherwise.
This confusion in analysis is especially problematic in light of
a more fundamental difficulty with the opinion. The reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectation analysis is inappropriate in cases in-
volving takings of property that is indivisible, and that can never
be subject to a partial taking.6 The "reasonable investment-
backed expectations" test was developed to determine whether
partial takings violate the fifth amendment. Indeed, the reason-
able expectations test makes little sense in the context of a com-
plete taking: one would scarcely expect a person to invest in a
property interest that he could expect to be entirely destroyed by
the government. A complete taking therefore must always interfere
with reasonable expectations.
The Court first articulated the "reasonable investment-backed
expectations" test in Penn Central. In that case, there was no dis-
pute that Grand Central Terminal was property, or that the re-
strictions interfered with the owner's use of the property to some
extent. The question at issue was whether the interference-that
is, the partial taking-was sufficiently serious to offend the fifth
amendment.6 7 The Court found that the restrictions did leave the
terminal owners with some beneficial uses of their property re-
maining. Thus, the reasonable investment-backed expectations of
the owners had not been totally eliminated. 8 The Court used in-
terference with expectations as a way of measuring the seriousness
of the regulation's partial destruction of the property interest at
issue. Similarly, in Monsanto the Court used the same fac-
tor-interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions-in analyzing an alleged taking of trade secrets .6
, See notes 32-36 and accompanying text above.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012.
" Professor Epstein has criticized even the position that this analysis can be applied to
partial takings; he indicates that there is no meaningful distinction between partial and
complete takings for this purpose. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain 155 (1985).
11 438 U.S. at 107, 122.
Id. at 137.
467 U.S. at 1004-05.
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In applying this test in Monsanto, however, the Court ignored
a vital fact about trade secrets: they cannot be taken partially. In
most ordinary takings clause cases, the "bundle of rights" compris-
ing the property interest in question contains several distinguish-
able "sticks." In Pruneyard, for example, the shopping center
owner's sticks included the right to exclude others, but it also in-
cluded other sticks such as the right of alienation and the right of
use. The Court concluded that the minimal interference with the
right to exclude caused by the distribution of leaflets in the com-
mon area of the mall did not "take" the owner's property. 70
With trade secrets, however, there can be no minimal interfer-
ence. The property right consists of only one indivisible stick: the
right to protection of the secrecy of the trade secret.71 If that stick
is compromised, the property has been taken completely.
It might be argued that disclosure of a trade secret does not
prevent the owner from continuing to use the secret, and that the
"use" stick is separable from the secrecy stick. These arguments,
however, mistake the true nature of a trade secret. A trade secret is
information "that derives independent economic value . . . from
not being generally known. 1 7 2 With the secrecy lost, the indepen-
dent economic value is gone-because the advantage it gives the
owner over his competitors is gone-and the information is worth
no more than any publicly available information. The trade secret
is not the information itself, but the extra value the information
possesses by virtue of its secrecy.
In Monsanto, the Court recognized that the right to exclude
others from knowledge of the secret is "central to the very defini-
tion of the property interest. 7 But the Court failed to draw the
conclusion that follows from this premise: that partial takings of
trade secrets are impossible, and that as a result no inquiry into
the existence of reasonable investment-backed expectations should
have been made. Indeed, the decision suggests that whether dis-
closure of a trade secret constitutes a taking depends on the use
subsequently made of the secret information: the Court remarks
70 447 U.S. at 83 ("There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohib-
iting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center.").
7' This fundamental principle of trade secret law is recognized in every state, even
where the state law formally treats trade secrets as a tort cause of action rather than as
property. See discussion of state trade secret law at notes 108-23 and accompanying text
below.
2 Uniform Trade Secretq Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 541-42 (West 1980).
73 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1011.
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that if the pesticide health data revealed problems that made the
product less valuable, its disclosure would not constitute a tak-
ing.7 "4 Because of the indivisible nature of a trade secret, however,
such disclosure would also give competitors the benefit of that
knowledge, and any disclosure, whatever its incidental effect on
the demand for and market value of the pesticide, is a complete
taking of the secret, which is the property. For that reason,
FIFRA's disclosure provisions are not analogous to limited zoning
regulations, which interfere only partially with the value of the
regulated property. An accurate analog to federally mandated dis-
closure of trade secrets is not a limited zoning regulation enacted
pursuant to state law, but a federal statute appropriating as fed-
eral property all buildings constructed in a particular state after
enactment of the statute.7 5
Because any public disclosure of a trade secret is a complete
taking, the recognition of a state law property interest should have
ended the Court's fifth amendment analysis. The proper conclu-
sion would have been that disclosure of trade secrets pursuant to
the pre-1972 and post-1978 FIFRA provisions, where state law pro-
tected those secrets, was a taking within the meaning of the fifth
amendment without regard to the existence of investment-backed
expectations, and therefore regardless of a promise of confidential-
ity in any federal statute.
B. Prospective Takings: Trade Secrets as Core Common Law
Rights
1. Prospective takings. One might argue that the Court could
have saved Monsanto from incoherence simply by admitting that
the federal government can prospectively alter state property
rights. Under this theory, the supremacy clause would allow the
federal government to preempt or condition a state's definition of
certain property interests, but the takings clause would prohibit
the government from doing so to interests already in place. Thus,
the disclosure of data submitted after 1978 would be permissible
74 Id. at 1012 n.15.
71 Moreover, in the case of zoning, all property owners benefit (at least theoretically)
from such regulations, in the form of enhanced property values. Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272
U.S. 365, 394-97 (1926). But one might argue that a pesticide manufacturer also benefits
from such implicit compensation. The ability to market a pesticide both nationally and in-
ternationally might be enhanced by regulations that provide some assurances to consumers
as to the safety of the pesticide. If this were so, however, pesticide manufacturers would
welcome mandatory disclosure pursuant to FIFRA rather than resisting it, as they did in
Monsanto.
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because the government had provided notice that such disclosure
might occur, preempting expectations based on state law. The dis-
closure of yet-to-be-created trade secrets therefore would not con-
stitute a taking. But this argument is flawed for several reasons.
First, though the Court recognized that the process of develop-
ing commercial pesticides involves a great deal of both money and
time,76 it failed to note that the confidential fruits of developmen-
tal research, where the research is undertaken with the expectation
that these resulting trade secrets would be protected property,
would be "taken." In other words, the Court seemed to assume
that any notice prior to registration would be adequate to protect
trade secret developers from dissipation of their research ef-
forts-no matter how short the notice was in comparison to the
length of time required to develop the secrets involved.7 Under
this insensitive assumption, a great deal of confidential research
and development information not yet fully coalesced, but nonethe-
less providing competitive advantages and thus deserving of pro-
tection as trade secret property, could be taken without compensa-
tion. Moreover, in practical terms there is no way in which a notice
statute could be enacted so as to avoid taking such property. By
definition, the property embodied in ongoing research and develop-
ment programs is secret; a legislature therefore could not deter-
mine how long a waiting period would be necessary before a notice
statute could take effect, so as to avoid taking the property.
Second, the indivisible nature of trade secrets7" belies the ar-
gument that the federal government's announcement that it will
disclose yet-to-be-created trade secrets is not a prospective taking.
Once the government decides to disclose all trade secrets created
after a certain date, those secrets have lost all their value, as has
the research invested in developing them. Zoning regulation pro-
vides an instructive contrast. A regulation specifying that no build-
ings above a certain height are to be built in a certain area is not a
prospective taking because it compromises only one stick in the
bundle of property rights that accompanies land ownership in that
area. But in the case of trade secrets, any disclosure by the govern-
ment of data supplied pursuant to a federal statute is an unconsti-
tutional complete taking, because the only value that inheres in a
71 Id. at 998 (noting that the district court found typical expenditures to be $5 million
to $15 million for several years, and developmental periods to range from fourteen to
twenty-two years).
" 467 U.S. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 See notes 66-74 and accompanying text above.
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trade secret lies in its "not being generally known. ' '79
2. "Core" common law rights. Even if notice under a disclos-
ure statute is held to be adequate (assuming a court could make
such a determination), yet-to-be-created trade secrets still merit
protection from disclosure. This protection rests on the fundamen-
tal principle of the takings clause that "there are limits on govern-
mental authority to abolish 'core' common-law rights, including
rights against trespass, at least without a compelling showing of
necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy." 80
Thus, the government's ability to alter trade secret protection,
even prospectively with adequate notice, is limited to the extent
that protection of trade secrets is such a "core" common law right.
In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,"" the Su-
preme Court found that certain common law rights cannot be
taken, even prospectively and pursuant to a notice statute, unless
they are taken for a public purpose and just compensation is paid.
The statute at issue in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies provided that
"[a]ll interest accruing from moneys deposited [in interpleader ac-
tions] shall be deemed income of the office of the clerk of the cir-
cuit court. '82 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute be-
cause the deposited funds were "considered 'public money'" from
the date of deposit until withdrawal; "the statute takes only what
it creates"; and "[t]here is no unconstitutional taking because in-
terest earned on the clerk of the circuit court's registry account is
not private property. 8 3
79 See notes 71-72 and accompanying text above. A simple hypothetical may help to
show why FIFRA's disclosure provision constitutes a taking and not simply a permissible
regulation. Compare Monsanto's loss of its preexisting right to sell pesticides without trade
secret disclosure with a heroin producer's loss, from a perfectly permissible prohibition on
narcotics sales, of his preexisting right to sell the drug. The heroin statute neutrally prohib-
its all sales of heroin by anyone. By contrast, the post-1978 FIFRA data disclosures took
Monsanto's property and in effect gave it to Monsanto's competitors. Even assuming that
use of the data by Monsanto's competitors constituted a public use, 467 U.S. at 1016, this
use nevertheless took from Monsanto "something more and different from that which is
extracted from other members of the public," Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)-that is, from other pesticide manufacturers. It is as though the
heroin statute, instead of prohibiting sales, had taken one producer's heroin and given it to
all other producers, who were then allowed to sell it. Such a taking of "something more and
different" is the essence of a fifth amendment violation. See, e.g., Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49
(stating that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee. . . [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole").
8O Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., concurring).
81 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
82 Fla. Stat. § 28.33 (West 1974).
83 Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So.2d 951, 952-53 (Fla. 1979).
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The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The
Court concluded that the principal sum was private property, in
which the creditors of the fund had a property interest created by
the state law of interpleader. The fact that the creditors' property
rights would not mature until judgment did not prevent them from
asserting a legitimate claim to the interest realized on the principal
in the interim. Accordingly, the Court held:
The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund
itself and are property just as the fund itself is property....
[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation, even for the lim-
ited duration of the deposit in court. This is the very kind of
thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
meant to prevent.8
4
At first glance, this result appears irreconcilable with the mul-
titude of cases that teach that state law defines the limit as well as
existence of state law property rights.85 The Florida legislature,
through legitimate processes, had decided to circumscribe property
rights in funds deposited in interpleader actions. Nonetheless, the
Court held this decision violated the takings clause. The rationale
must have been that the statutory deprivation of interest tres-
passed on a key "incident of ownership" of the fund itself. It de-
nied one of the most important rights incident to the principal of
the interpleader fund-its interest-earning capacity. This value is
one of the "core" common law property rights that cannot be
taken without compensation even when, as in this case, there was
prior notice.86
84 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
85 Logan, 455 U.S. at 431, and cases cited therein; Annot. at 57 L.Ed.2d 1254 (cited in
note 41). For a general review of the case law in this area, see Annot., Federal Courts: Fed-
eral or State Law as Applicable in Determining What Is Property for which Compensation
Must Be Paid Upon Its Taking by the Federal Government, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 479 (1972 &
Supp. 1986).
8 In contrast to the key "incidents of ownership" in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
"quasi-property" that is created by purely private contractual arrangements does not consti-
tute a core common law right, and under certain circumstances it may be taken pursuant to
a notice statute. In Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1018, for example, the Court held
that a purely contractual limitation on the extent of liability of an employer withdrawing
from a private multi-employer pension plan could be constitutionally modified by a federal
statute requiring such an employer to pay his proportionate share of the plan's unfunded,
vested benefits. The Court applied the three factors (including "investment-backed expecta-
tions") enumerated in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, to determine whether an uncompen-
sated taking had occurred.
The result in Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., however, is distinguishable from takings of yet-
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The Court's failure to consider whether the Florida statute
disturbed the fund owners' reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions also strongly supports the view that "core" common law
rights, or key "incidents of ownership," are immune from prospec-
tive takings pursuant to a notice statute. These rights are so im-
portant that their divestiture from the property interest is suffi-
cient to constitute a taking of the property regardless of
"reasonable expectations" and regardless of whether the value of
the property is totally destroyed.
There are good reasons to think that trade secrets qualify as
the sort of "core" common law rights that, under Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, may not be taken even with notice. Even more so
than the deprivation of interest earnings in the Florida case, the
disclosure of trade secrets essentially destroys the property. Loss
of interest earnings does not destroy the value of the principal;
but, as emphasized above, disclosure destroys the value of the
trade secret, for secrecy is what makes a trade secret "property."
The long history of common law protection of trade secrets
also supports their status as core common law rights. The earliest
English case explicitly protecting trade secrets dates from the early
nineteenth century,87 and English courts of equity had long recog-
nized the possibility of such protection.8 8 Trade secrets were surely
an accepted part of English business practice, and therefore almost
certainly of its practical, unrecorded legal practice as well, long
before the adoption of the fifth amendment in this country.89 The
earliest recorded American trade secret case was decided in 1836 in
Massachusetts, holding that an exclusive secret of the "art of mak-
to-be-created trade secrets pursuant to a notice statute. The statute upheld in that case
effected only a partial taking of the employer's net worth, and the property involved had
been created solely by a contractual arrangement between two private parties. The statute
"only. . .nullified a contractual provision limiting liability by imposing an additional obli-
gation that is otherwise within the power of Congress to impose." 106 S.Ct. at 1026. Except
for the payment requirements, employers could abrogate their legal obligations simply by
agreeing with each other that they were not obligated. By contrast, the property rights asso-
ciated with trade secrets enjoy the blessing of state governments, and it is this blessing that
is the primary source of property rights.
87 Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394, 37 Eng.Rep. 425 (1820) (protecting recipes for
veterinary medicines).
88 See, e.g., Newbery v. James, 2 Mer. 446 (1817) (implying that a misappropriation of
a secret for manufacturing pills might give rise to a cause of action); Canham v. Jones, 35
Eng.Rep. 302, 303, 2 V. & B. 218, 221 (1813) (indicating that a right could be established in
a trade secret for a specific medical recipe); Gibblett v. Read, 9 Mod. 459, 460, 88 Eng.Rep.
573, 574 (1744) (noting that "physical secrets or nostrums" may be part of an estate).
89 See, e.g., Canham, 35 Eng.Rep. at 302, 2 V. & B. at 218 (secret medical recipe sold
for 6,000 pounds in 1780).
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ing chocolate" was a form of property that could be sold.90 In any
event, protection for trade secrets is a much older part of Ameri-
can law than many other entitlements to intangible property
deemed worthy of constitutional protection, such as a driver's li-
cense, a high school education, and utility service.91 In fact, it is
older than all of the forms of intangible property cited by the
Court in recognizing a property right in a tort claim.9 2 Thus, pro-
tection of trade secrets is one of the "core" common law rights, one
that a federal statute cannot unilaterally abrogate.
The Monsanto Court quoted extensively from Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, but it failed to give analogous protection
against prospective takings of yet-to-be-created trade secrets pur-
suant to a notice statute, because it failed to appreciate the indi-
visibility of the secrecy stick. Once that indivisibility is realized,
the conclusion that notice cannot excuse a taking of the property is
inevitable.
C. The Monsanto "Bargain": An Unconstitutional Condition
In addition to examining the question of investment-backed
expectations, the Court in Monsanto supported its holding that
the post-1978 FIFRA disclosure provisions did not constitute a
taking by noting that "a voluntary submission of data by an appli-
cant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can
hardly be called a taking."9 3 In effect, the Court reasoned that
Monsanto bought a license to sell pesticides in the United States
and paid for it by disclosing its data pursuant to the post-1978
statute. This argument might be persuasive if the bargain recog-
nized by the Court were of the type that two parties, negotiating
freely, could be expected to reach. But the "bargain" in Monsanto
was not voluntary.
The involuntary nature of the exchange in Monsanto is clear
in light of the consequences Monsanto would have faced if it had
refused to submit the data: the company could not have marketed
its pesticides in the United States if it had so refused. The penalty
for refusal to comply with FIFRA amendments was loss of a preex-
isting right that Monsanto certainly possessed between 1972 and
1978-the right to sell pesticides in the United States without be-
:0 Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837).
*' See note 36 above.
92 See Logan, 455 U.S. at 431.
93 467 U.S. at 1007.
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ing forced to give up its trade secrets. 4 In effect, the 1978 FIFRA
conditions the receipt of a valuable government benefit-the right
to sell-upon applicants' willingness to forego their fifth amend-
ment rights.
The government's ability to compel disclosure of trade secrets
in such a fashion is limited by the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, which prevents the government from conditioning the re-
ceipt of public benefits on an individual's willingness to waive his
constitutional rights.9 5 Seen in this light, the "exchange" approved
by Justice Blackmun looks more like extortion-of the "'Your
money or your life variety.''9 The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, as currently interpreted,97 must prevent the government
,1 Justice O'Connor believed Monsanto enjoyed this right before 1972 as well. Id. at
1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although Monsanto still may market pesticides internationally without subjecting itself
to post-1978 FIFRA regulations, see id. at 1007 n.11., this does not prove that disclosure
under FIFRA is not a taking. The post-1978 FIFRA still unconstitutionally conditions a
previously conferred government benefit-the right to sell in the United States-upon
Monsanto's waiver of its fifth amendment rights.
" An early expression of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is found in Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926):
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which
[denies] the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an
act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right
in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.
A more recent expression may be found in Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597: "even though a
person has no 'right' to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, [it cannot do so] on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests." See also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301
(1981); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976).
" See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, and the Protection of
Information, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309, 348. In Monsanto, the coercive "exchange" is more like
"your property or the value of your property." Monsanto can either give trade secret data to
EPA subject to FIFRA disclosure or keep the data secret and give up its economic
value-the ability to register and sell the product in the U.S. (which puts the owner in the
same position as a trade secret thief enjoined from using the secret). Either way, Monsanto
is made worse off by the government's "offer".
97 For a skeptical view that there may be no unconstitutional conditions doctrine after
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), see Easterbrook, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. at 348 (cited in note
96). Shortly after Buckley v. Valeo, however, the Court reaffirmed the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359, in which it relied on Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, to
strike down conditions on political patronage employment that interfered with the employ-
ees' exercise of their first amendment rights. The Court again explicitly relied on the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine in Branti, 445 U.S. at 514. Moreover, lower courts continue to
recognize the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See, e.g., Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d
1221, 1225 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The unconstitutional condition line of analysis . . . is un-
equivocally accepted by the Branti and Elrod Courts"); Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 505
(8th Cir. 1984); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1983) (condition imposed on
zoning change held unconstitutional); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F.Supp. 492, 502
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (striking down conditions placed on right to import films duty-free estab-
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from using such coercive offers to obtain complete waivers of con-
stitutional rights.
D. A Coherent Understanding of Monsanto
Monsanto looked to state law to determine whether the trade
secrets in question were property within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. Yet the Court seemed to decide that disclosure of
such secrets would not constitute a taking unless the same federal
statute that called for disclosure also provided explicit assurance of
confidentiality. However, to be coherent, the decision must be read
differently.
The Court should have deemed the disclosures in Monsanto to
be takings. Takings clause jurisprudence applied to the peculiar
features of trade secrets teaches that: (1) any federal interference
with existing trade secrets that are protected by state law will con-
stitute a complete taking, for which a public purpose and just com-
pensation are required; and (2) prospective takings of trade secrets
pursuant to a notice statute interfere with a "core" common law
right, and therefore also come within the fifth amendment's pro-
scription. A proper application of Monsanto should reflect these
principles and those parts of the decision that do not conform
should be limited to the Court's specific assumptions and the par-
ticular facts of the case.
One way to reconcile Monsanto's recognition of state-defined
trade secret property rights with these principles would be to re-
quire explicit federal statutory protection of a property right only
where a finding has been made that no legitimate expectation of
protection could arise from some other source, such as state law or
past agency practice. Unfortunately, the lower courts have read
Monsanto to require that explicit statutory protection always be
present in order to recognize a property interest, without even con-
sidering whether, in some cases, a submitter of data could have
reasonably formed an expectation of protection upon some other
basis.98
It may be argued that the suggested reading of Monsanto
proves too much because it would interfere with federal and state
regulation of such matters as food and drug labeling, and with
toxic substance disclosure statutes such as the New Jersey Right to
lished by treaty); Abraham v. Pekarski, 537 F.Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (political pa-
tronage firing). The unconstitutional conditions doctrine clearly remains vital despite Buck-
ley v. Valeo.
" See note 57 above.
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Know Act, discussed in New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce
v. Hughey." As for food and drug ingredients, if they were under-
stood as trade secrets, they would be entitled to the protection ad-
vocated here. However, after a century of federal and state food
and drug regulation, it is not likely that a coherent argument could
be made that the ingredients (as opposed to manufacturing meth-
ods) of currently marketed foods and drugs are trade secrets pro-
tected by state law. The protracted, general acquiescence in dis-
closure of confidential information of the ingredients of products,
such as food and drugs, already on the market may be thought of
as analogous to allowing adverse possession of one's real property.
Both state trade secret law and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
recognize that failure to protect a trade secret can result in its
loss. 100 However, such a waiver cannot apply automatically to
newly developed products placed on the market for the first time.
In Monsanto, the Court operated under the assumption that
pesticide registrants were well aware of the substantial possibility
that the federal government "would find disclosure to be in the
public interest." 101 In essence, the Court simply assumed that the
trade secret baseline was like that of food and drug ingredients,
long since consensually waived as state property interests. Justice
O'Connor sharply criticized the Court's assumptions concerning
the pre-1972 baseline and would have remanded to the district
court because "the extent of Monsanto's pre-1972 expectations
. . . is a heavily factual question.M0 2
As for environmental and public health statutes, strengthened
protection of trade secrets would not hamper their operation se-
verely. The disclosure provisions of these statutes are fairly narrow
and tend not to invade protected trade secrets significantly,1 03 and
they are justified by strong public health considerations. Even if
these disclosure requirements were held to effect takings, many of
them are not critical to the enforcement of the acts-for example,
:9 600 F.Supp. at 609-12.
100 See Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b (1939); Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
§ 11(4), 14 U.L.A. 542 (West 1980) (both requiring "efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy").
101 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1008-09.
0o1 Id. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103 Most of these statutes are limited in two ways: they usually require disclosure of
only safety-related data, and even where the identity of specific product constituents must
be disclosed, concentration data are not always required. These statutes may inform the
public that a particular breakfast cereal contains sugar, but they do not allow anyone to
discover how the cereal is manufactured.
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the disclosure provisions of the Clean Air Act'1 4 and the various
"Right to Know" acts cited in the Solicitor General's brief on be-
half of the EPA in Monsanto,10 5 are not critical to the enforcement
of those statutes.108
The situation is far different, however, with generalized dis-
closure statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act. Such
statutes invade trade secrets to a far greater degree than do spe-
cific public health statutes, and they lack an equivalent compelling
justification for disclosure. The next section scrutinizes the prac-
tice of disclosure under FOIA in light of the takings clause.
IV. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE STATUTES AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The takings issue in Monsanto-that disclosure of data could
effect a compensable taking of property by disclosing trade secrets
protected as property under state law-arises whenever a govern-
ment agency obtains information that the agency might disclose to
third parties. Federal and state disclosure statutes, like the Free-
dom of Information Act, are the most important mechanisms
through which such disclosure can occur.107 If courts read Mon-
santo coherently and refuse to allow the federal statute's own pro-
visions to define what constitutes a taking, FOIA disclosures will
' 42 U.S.C. § 7607(a)(1) (1982).
105 Brief of Appellant Environmental Protection Agency 40 n. 29, reprinted in U.S. Su-
preme Court Briefs and Records, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
106 In most cases, the enforcement activities authorized by the statutes depend on
agency knowledge of the information the agencies collect. For instance, the FDA could mon-
itor the safety of food additives without disclosing them to the public.
107 This comment discusses only the federal Freedom of Information Act. However,
many states have enacted similar statutes. In Illinois, for example, the state Freedom of
Information Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 116, par. 201-11 (1985), went into effect on July 1,"
1984. It appears to differ from the federal statute in a number of ways: most notably, the
Illinois statute specifies that it should not be used to "further a commercial enterprise." Id.
at 1 201. Its trade secret exemption is as follows: "Trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person or business where such trade secrets or information are
proprietary, privileged, or confidential, or where disclosure of such trade secrets or informa-
tion may cause competitive harm." Id. at V 207(g). This definition seems to incorporate the
"substantial competitive harm" standard of the federal FOIA case law discussed below at
notes 140-42, but the test is presented as enlarging rather than limiting the scope of the
exemption: the statute covers trade secrets or information whose disclosure would cause
competitive harm rather than imposing a requirement of competitive harm upon the defini-
tion of a trade secret. See generally Chicago Lawyer 1985 FOIA Guide, Chicago Lawyer 5,
col. 1 (Oct. 1985). In the first case interpreting the Illinois FOIA, however, the court ob-
served in dicta that the legislative history of the Illinois FOIA indicated an intent to import
federal FOIA decisions into Illinois substantive law. Roulette v. Dept. of Cent. Manage-
ments, 141 Ill.App.3d 394, 490 N.E.2d 60, 64 (1986). That interpretation seems irreconcila-
ble with the language of the statute itself. Thus, the future direction of Illinois' FOIA law is
uncertain.
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be found to violate the fifth amendment in many cases. Even if
courts follow the prevailing, inconsistent interpretation of Mon-
santo and make trade secret protection contingent on a federal
guarantee of confidentiality, the state law definition of property
still will limit an agency's ability to disclose information under
FOIA.
A. State Law Definitions of Trade Secret Property
Monsanto looked to state law in the first instance to define
trade secret rights. Thus it will be useful first to examine briefly
how various states define and protect trade secrets.108 In particular,
this section examines state law treatment of confidential business
information, in order to lay the groundwork for the comparisons to
the D.C. Circuit's treatment of similar data in its FOIA decisions.
Monsanto suggests that most states that subscribe to the Re-
statement of Torts definition of trade secrets09 endow trade
secrets with the attributes of property. 10 Even before Monsanto,
practically all jurisdictions had recognized the property status of
trade secrets."' Trade secrets are thus widely recognized as prop-
erty, and there is no indication that they will soon lose this status.
A more controversial issue, however, is whether a particular
type of information constitutes a trade secret that state law recog-
nizes as property. 1 2 In particular, while all jurisdictions provide
some protection for industrial trade secrets of a technical nature,
there is a divergence of views as to the protectability of confiden-
tial business information.
108 This examination raises the question of which state's law will apply. This complex
choice of law problem is beyond the scope of this comment. It would appear, however, that
the interest analysis used by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, see, e.g.,
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 597 F.Supp. 934, 938 (D. D.C. 1984), would
lead to the result that the situs of the trade secret's use or of its owner, rather than the
place of the litigation, controls. Either the state of ownership or of use would have a greater
interest in the trade secret than the forum state. See Wearly v. F.T.C., 462 F.Supp. 589, 594-
95 n.6 (D. N.J. 1978) (law to be used in determining rights in a trade secret is, as with other
intangible property interests, that of the situs of the owner of the interest).
1' Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939) ("First Restatement"), discussed below at notes
113-23 and accompanying text.
:so 467 U.S. at 1016.
1 See Milgrim, 1 Trade Secrets, § 1.01[2] (cited in note 4), and cases cited therein.
This common law recognition is bolstered in thirty-eight states by explicit statutory protec-
tion for trade secrets. Id. at App. B, B-I.
"I See id. § 2.09 ("[there are] many instances, particularly with reference to customer
lists and business (as opposed to industrial) secrets, where different jurisdictions reach con-
trary conclusions concerning trade secret status with respect to essentially identical
matters").
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The majority of states derive their law of trade secrets from
section 757 of the first Restatement of Torts, which contains a pro-
scription against "disclosure or use of another's trade secret" as
part of its discussion of tortious interference with business rela-
tions."' The First Restatement defines "trade secret" as "any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. 1" 4
Further, "it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral
events in the conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount
or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain
employees.. . . A trade secret is a process or device for continuous
use in the operation of the business. '" 5 Under the First Restate-
ment, trade secret protection generally extends to confidential bus-
iness information-for example, price and cost information-if it is
clearly shown that the information actually had objective value de-
pendent on its secrecy and that it was treated confidentially by its
owner.
116
11 First Restatement § 757 (cited in note 101). The authors of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts declined to include a section on trade secrets because trade regulation had
evolved into a separate branch of law that was no longer based primarily on tort principles.
Restatement (Second) of Torts at 1 (1979). See also Milgrim, 1 Trade Secrets, § 2.01 n.2
(cited in note 4). Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have used at least part of
the section 757 definition of a trade secret. However, several of these states, as noted at note
117 below, have since adopted the statutory definition in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
Courts also sometimes mix parts of the section 757 definition with other definitions. See,
e.g., Hayden's Sport Center, Inc. v. Johnson, 109 Ill.App.3d 1140, 1146-47, 441 N.E.2d 927,
932 (1982) (using parts of the section 757 definition together with an older definition taken
from the Corpus Juris Secundum, described at text accompanying note 122 below). Even
the adoption of a statutory definition may not eliminate this practice. See, e.g., American
Totalisator Co. v. Autotote Ltd., Civ. No. 7268, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1983) (referring to
decisions utilizing law of Pennsylvania, Oregon, Virginia, and Oklahoma to aid in defining
the term "trade secret," despite the existence of a statutory definition in Delaware). There-
fore, in each case care must be taken to look beyond references to section 757 to the actual,
substantive criteria in use, which may vary significantly even among the states that have
adopted section 757.
114 First Restatement § 757, comment b (cited in note 100). A trade secret "may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving mater-
ials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers." Id. For a discussion of
how to identify a trade secret under section 757, see Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and
Confidential Information under Georgia Law, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 623, 635 n.51 (1985).
"5 First Restatement §757, comment b. The First Restatement also contains a provi-
sion for protection of "ephemeral data": "One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival
business interest, procures by improper means information about another's business is liable
to the other for the harm caused by his possession, disclosure, or use of the information." Id.
§ 759. For a description of the limited use this provosion has seen, see Ramon F. Klitzke,
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 277, 286 n.53 (1980).
" See, e.g., Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 586 F.Supp. 704, 709 (E.D. Mo. 1984), for
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Eleven other states have adopted substantially identical ver-
sions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). 117 The UTSA
contains the following definition of a trade secret:
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or poten-
tial, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.11 8
Unlike the Restatement's definition, the UTSA does not require
that a secret be "continuously used in one's business" in order to
qualify as a trade secret.11 9 Further, by defining a trade secret as
"information," the UTSA establishes a single standard for both
business and technical secrets.120
Georgia, on the other hand, exemplifies the opposite extreme
from the UTSA states with regard to trade secret protection for
confidential business information. Georgia has explicitly rejected
the section 757 definition" and instead uses an older definition
derived from the Corpus Juris Secundum: "'A trade secret, within
the rules pertaining to the rights which can be protected by an
injunction, is a plan, process, tool, mechanism, or compound,
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it
must be confided in order to apply it to the uses intended.' ,,122
Thus, Georgia courts have uniformly refused to recognize price and
an illustration of the application of section 757 to confidential business information. For
further examples, see Milgrim, 1 Trade Secrets at § 2.0918][b] n.449 (cited in note 4).
117 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980). For the text of the Act, see Milgrim, 3 Trade Secrets at App.
A (cited in note 4). The following states have adopted the UTSA: Minnesota, Arkansas,
Kansas, Louisiana, Idaho, Washington, Indiana, Delaware, Connecticut, North Dakota, and
California. Id. at 3 App. AA, AA-2.
118 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980).
Compare First Restatement § 757, comment b.
120 For an example of how the UTSA protects confidential business information as a
trade secret, see American Totalisator, Civ. No. 7268, slip op. For the opposing view that
business information is not a trade secret, see notes 121-23 and accompanying text below.
121 See Textile Rubber & Chemical Co. v. Shook, 243 Ga. 587, 589-90, 255 S.E.2d 705,
707-08 (1979).
"' Taylor Freezer Sales Co., Inc. v. Sweden Freezer Eastern Corp., 224 Ga. 160, 164,
160 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1968), quoting 43 C.J.S. § 148 at 750 (1955).
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cost information as trade secrets.12 3
B. The Freedom of Information Act Under a Coherent View of
Monsanto
FOIA allows any person to obtain access to the records of any
federal agency, subject only to compliance with the formalities of
the statute. FOIA does, however, explicitly protect trade secrets in
the custody of the federal government.124 Section (b)(4) allows fed-
eral agencies responding to FOIA requests to exercise their discre-
tion and refuse to disclose certain types of information, including
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential." 12 5 Even information
within the scope of exemption of (b)(4) may be disclosed pursuant
to agency discretion. 126 However, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) 127 provides for judicial review of actions taken pursuant
to agency discretion;1 28 and if information falls within the (b)(4)
exemption, its disclosure may be an abuse of that discretion.
129
Thus, the APA provides the primary mechanism by which submit-
ters of data may challenge an agency decision to release
information. 3"
Because FOIA includes special venue provisions that tend to
123 Taylor Freezer Sales, 160 S.E.2d at 358-60. For other cases reaching the same con-
clusion, see Textile Rubber, 243 Ga. at 592, 255 S.E.2d at 709; Howard Schultz & Assocs. of
the Southeast, Inc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 187, 236 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1977); Vendo Co. v.
Long, 213 Ga. 774, 777, 102 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1958).
22, The FOIA disclosure mandate overrides any promises of confidentiality the agency
may have made. See, e.g., Robles v. Envir. Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir.
1973); Racal-Milgo Gov. Systems, Inc. v. Small Bus. Admin., 559 F.Supp. 4, 6 (D. D.C.
1981). But see Wearly v. Fed. Trade Comm., 462 F.Supp. 589, 600 n.13 (D. N.J. 1978) (sug-
gesting that the FOIA exemptions protecting trade secrets should be read as mandatory
rather than as discretionary). While the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, prohibits gov-
ernment employees from disclosing trade secrets, the Monsanto Court refused to hold that
this was a promise of confidentiality. 467 U.S. at 1008-09.
12 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4).
:26 Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
27 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1982).
:28 Id. § 706 (2)(A).
29 See, e.g., Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Costle, 662 F.2d 45, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United Technologies Corp. v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 574 F.Supp. 86 (D. D.C.
1983); J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F.Supp. 421 (D. Md. 1982).
130 Such a challenge is termed a "reverse-FOIA action." See James O'Reilly, 1 Federal
Information Disclosure § 10.06 (1985), for a detailed account of the steps required to bring a
reverse-FOIA action. For a discussion of reverse-FOIA actions in the trade secret context,
see Note, Constitutional Limitations on Government Disclosure of Trade Secret Informa-
tion, 56 Ind. L. J. 347, 350-54 (1981).
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encourage suits in the D.C. Circuit," 1 and because both of FOIA's
most frequent users-public interest lobbying groups and federal
agencies-are concentrated in the Washington, D.C. area, nearly
all of the more than 100 cases interpreting exemption (b)(4) have
been decided within the D.C. Circuit. 3 2 Therefore, the D.C. Cir-
cuit's view of the extent of protection that exemption (b) (4) affords
to trade secrets, and its view of the meaning of the terms "trade
secret" and "commercial or financial information," are most im-
portant to the exemption's working.
Although commentators discussing the language of exemption
(b)(4) before its enactment had noted its ambiguity, 33 the D.C.
Circuit settled on the following interpretation of the exemption's
scope:
(1) trade secrets, or
(2) commercial or financial information that was obtained
from a person and that is privileged or confidential. 34
This interpretation has two serious flaws. It draws a spurious dis-
tinction between "trade secrets" and "commercial or financial in-
formation,"'' 3 and it underprotects the latter by imposing addi-
tional requirements-"obtained from a person" and "privileged or
confidential"-for "commercial or financial information" to qualify
for the protection of exemption (b)(4). Thus, exemption (b)(4) as
interpreted by the D.C. Circuit conflicts with the definition of
trade secrets prevailing in forty-nine of the fifty states. 3 6 Indeed,
by 1982, the D.C. Circuit had completely excluded price and cost
information from its definition of "trade secret" and in effect had
abandoned the body of state law defining trade secrets. Second,
131 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B). This provision allows an action to be brought against
an agency in the plaintiff's home district, or in the district where the agency records are
located, or in the District of Columbia.
131 See Annot., What Constitutes "Trade Secrets and Commercial or Financial Infor-
mation," 21 A.L.R. Fed. 224 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
"I For a discussion of views at the time of enactment, see U.S. Department of Justice,
Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative
Procedure Act (1967); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis,
34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (1967).
134 National Parks and Conservation Assoc. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir.
1974). This interpretation of the statutory language is now "reasonably certain" as a result
of subsequent D.C. Circuit cases. Milgrim, 1 Trade Secrets, § 6.02[A][2] (cited in note 4).
135 The vast majority of states' trade secret laws do not make such a distinction, and
most states include secret business information in their definition of trade secrets. See text
accompanying notes 113-20 above.
136 See section IV-A above. Only the Georgia approach resembles the D.C. Circuit's
view that confidential business information cannot constitute a trade secret.
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overlooking state law, the D.C. Circuit has developed its own idio-
syncratic definition of technical trade secrets that is much nar-
rower than the definitions used in most states. As a result, opera-
tion of the FOIA often invades fifth amendment protections for
trade secrets that exist under a coherent view of Monsanto.
1. Current FOIA treatment of confidential business infor-
mation. The seminal case dealing with the meaning of exemption
(b)(4) in the context of business information is National Parks &
Conservation Association v. Morton.137 In National Parks, the
D.C. Circuit observed that FOIA contains no definition of the term
"confidential" for purposes of determining the protection of confi-
dential business information under the second half of (b)(4). The
court then noted that past decisions had been influenced by the
1965 Senate Report on the legislation, which emphasized that the
key test was whether the information "would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was ob-
tained."' 3 8 While retaining this requirement, National Parks
fabricated, out of whole cloth, another semi-objective test:
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for pur-
poses of the exemption if disclosure of the information is
likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to impair the
Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the
future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive po-
sition of the person from whom the information was
obtained. e39
Thus, the D.C. Circuit has interpreted section (b)(4) of FOIA
to mean that federal agencies have discretion to protect confiden-
tial business information such as secret cost and pricing data only
where disclosure would interfere with government operations or
cause "substantial competitive harm" to the supplier. To establish
that such harm will occur, the supplier must demonstrate both the
existence of actual competition and the currency of the confiden-
tial information.140 Because the deterrence and substantial compet-
itive harm tests are inconsistent with rights protected by state
137 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
138 Id. at 770, citing S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
139 498 F.2d at 770 (footnote omitted). The first test is usually referred to as the "de-
terrence" requirement, and the second is called the "substantial competitive harm"
requirement.
140 Braintree Electric Light Dept. v. Dept. of Energy, 494 F.Supp. 287, 291 (D. D.C.
1980).
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trade secret laws,141 agency disclosure of business information pur-
suant to these guidelines effects a taking of property under the
proper reading of Monsanto.
2. Current FOIA treatment of technical trade secrets. Not
long after the National Parks decision, the D.C. Circuit narrowed
even further the scope of protection accorded technical trade
secrets under (b)(4),112 and in 1983, it broke definitively with the
law of most states in Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
Food & Drug Administration.'43 In Public Citizen, the court rea-
soned that Congress would have looked to interpretations of the
Trade Secrets Act in framing exemption (b)(4). Therefore, the
court concluded, Congress must have intended to limit trade secret
protection to a scope no broader than the construction of the Act
set forth in the early case of United States ex rel Norwegian Ni-
trogen Products Co. v. United States Tariff Commission.' Al-
though the law of most states is now quite different from the view
taken in Norwegian Nitrogen,145 the D.C. Circuit in Public Citizen
proceeded to formulate its definition of a trade secret based on
that case: "a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process,
or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or
processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end
product of either innovation or substantial effort. '14 6
This definition not only excludes business information from
the ambit of "trade secrets," following the National Parks reading
of exemption (b)(4), but it also imposes a requirement of innova-
tion not unlike that for a patent. Thus, the D.C. Circuit's defini-
tion of a technical trade secret conflicts with state law.147 While
14, See text accompanying notes 113-20 above.
142 See Worthington Compressors, 662 F.2d at 51 (appearing to apply "substantial
competitive harm" test to disclosure of trade secrets).
243 704 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
144 6 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1925). In that case, the disputed information consisted of data
on certain elements of the cost of foreign nitrate fertilizer production, such as electric power
costs, which the commission had requested for use in enforcing tariff regulations. Technical
trade secrets were not involved. The Norwegian Nitrogen court was interpreting a predeces-
sor to the Trade Secrets Act. For a discussion of Norwegian Nitrogen, see Mark Q. Con-
nelly, Trade Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Dis-
closures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 207, 230.
145 Only Georgia retains a view of trade secrets that is really consistent with the Nor-
wegian Nitrogen definition.
146 Public Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288.
47 While some state courts have required an element of discovery for an industrial
trade secret, this element arises more from practical concerns incidental to proof of secrecy
rather than from the public policy considerations underlying the patent law requirement of
novelty. See Milgrim, 1 Trade Secrets, § 2.08[2] (cited in note 4). The majority view is that
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this variance is partially explained by the D.C. Circuit's assump-
tion that federal common law should be used to define "trade se-
cret" in the FOIA context,148 that assumption itself is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's more recent position in Monsanto-that
federal law cannot redefine property rights already established by
state law.1 49
C. FOIA Under the Internally Inconsistent Reading of Monsanto
Even under the inconsistent reading of Monsanto, which al-
lows Congress to redefine the property status of trade secrets,
courts must recognize that FOIA-mandated disclosures of trade
secrets protected by state law are takings. The reasons are simple:
like the 1972-78 FIFRA, FOIA explicitly promises that trade
secrets in the custody of the federal government will remain
secrets.
The inconsistent reading of Monsanto requires an explicit as-
the prior state of the art is not relevant to trade secret protection. Id. at § 2.08[3]. Certainly
the Public Citizen requirement of "innovation or substantial effort" is not found in most
state trade secret decisions.
148 In light of the source of the Public Citizen definition of "trade secret," it is reasona-
ble to conclude that the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the term is a matter of federal
common law rather than D.C. law analogous to state law.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985), the United
Steelworkers sought review of a definition of trade secrets to be applied to an exemption
from the Occupational Safety and Health Act's requirement that workers be informed of
potential hazards (notably chemical hazards) in the workplace. The Act provided protection
for information that might constitute or reveal a trade secret "referred to in section 1905 of
Title 18." 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1982). The Third Circuit cited Public Citizen for the proposition
that the definition of "trade secret" in "other [federal] regulatory contexts" need not be the
same as that afforded by state law. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 741. Thus, it seems that other
circuits also believe the D.C. Circuit's views on FOIA reflect federal common law rather than
D.C. law analogous to state law.
"4, Treatment of trade secrets as "core" common law rights, see section III-B above,
inevitably leads to the conclusion that current FOIA disclosure practices are unconstitu-
tional. Invasions of "core" common law rights are constitutional only where there has been
"a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy."
Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., concurring). FOIA provides no alternative rem-
edy-that is, no compensation system-at all. Therefore, FOIA trade secret disclosures
must be justified only by a "compelling showing of necessity." That is, disclosure must be
necessary-to effectuate the FOIA's purpose-exposing the federal government's workings to
public scrutiny. See discussion of FOIA purposes in O'Reilly, 1 Federal Information Disclos-
ure at §§ 2, 4.03 (cited in note 130). Disclosure of the private trade secrets of persons who
happen to be dealing with the federal government will not, in most instances, further this
goal. Certainly it is difficult to see how such disclosure in the general FOIA context would be
compellingly necessary, in the sense that it could be argued that public health necessarily
compelled the disclosure of Monsanto's health and safety data. The standard of "compelling
necessity" clearly requires more than the "conceivable public purpose" standard applied to
ascertain the public or private character of a taking.
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surance of protection in the acquiring statute-or more carefully
stated, a finding that past practice could have produced a reasona-
ble investment-backed expectation of confidentiality.1 50 FOIA pro-
vides this, because whatever Congress's intent might have been
with respect to the "commercial or financial information" provi-
sion of section (b)(4), Congress in that provision almost certainly
intended to import the existing state law interpretations of the le-
gal term "trade secret."1 51 Thus, like the 1972-1978 FIFRA, FOIA
intended to continue state law protection for trade secrets.
FOIA also lacks whatever elements of a "bargain" were suffi-
cient to save FIFRA's disclosure provisions. The Monsanto Court
concluded that the post-1978 FIFRA provisions effectively allowed
pesticide manufacturers to "buy" a license to sell pesticides in the
United States by disclosing the data sought by the EPA.'52 It was
this "exchange" that allowed the Monsanto Court to conclude that
disclosures under the post-1978 FIFRA did not violate the fifth
amendment.15 3 By contrast, trade secret data, particularly in the
form of price and cost information, find their way into federal
agencies by a myriad of paths, few of which involve any quid pro
quo for submission of data. 5 4 Therefore, FOIA disclosures cannot
be justified by means of the "bargain" rationale used in the case of
disclosures under the post-1978 FIFRA.
CONCLUSION
Applied correctly so as to achieve both internal consistency
and harmony with other takings clause decisions, Monsanto estab-
lishes that state laws recognizing trade secrets as property trigger
fifth and fourteenth amendment protection for trade secrets.
Courts must substitute state law trade secret definitions for the
D.C. Circuit's federal common law definition, and they must inter-
150 See note 57 above.
151 See O'Reilly, 1 Federal Information Disclosure at § 14.06 n.1 (cited in note 130);
O'Reilly, Trade Secrets: Asleep at the Switch?, 12 Am. Intell. Prop. L.A. Q. J. 13, 15 (1984).
See also note 104 above.
152 467 U.S. at 1006-07.
,53 Id. at 1007.
" Few, if any, of these channels are consensual even in the sense that the post-1978
FIFRA was consensual. And even where other statutes provide guarantees, FOIA may ne-
gate them through bureaucratic carelessness. See Monsanto Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 753 F.2d
649 (8th Cir. 1985) (describing the improper disclosure of trade secret information pursuant
to a FOIA request).
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pret federal disclosure statutes such as FOIA to effectuate that
protection, which even the narrow reading of Monsanto requires.
Monsanto should be read as mandating full protection to the core
common law right of trade secret protection.
John C. Janka
